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Abstract: 
The Playwork Principles establish the professional and ethical framework for UK 
playworkers. They also create contradictions that have an ethical dimension. Following an 
historical contextualisation, the chapter critiques the assumption of the autonomous rational 
agent implicit in the Playwork Principles’ understanding of both play and playwork. It 
reconfigures playwork as relational, affective and affecting, embodied, situated and 
irreducible to representation in language. Through a diffractive reading of the work of Karen 
Barad, Rosi Braidotti and Judith Butler, it offers a posthuman, nomadic and relational ethics, 
acknowledging the emergent, ongoing and intra-active co-production of play spaces in which 
playworkers are already implicated. 
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Entangled in the midst of it: a diffractive expression of an ethics for playwork 
 
 
Something’s happening. Try as we might to gain an observer’s remove, 
that’s where we find ourselves: in the midst of it. There’s happening doing. 
This is where philosophical thinking must begin: immediately in the 
middle. 
(Massumi 2011: 1) 
 
Can we simply follow our passion to know without getting our hands 
dirty? … We are of the universe – there is no inside, no outside … There is 
no getting away from ethics – mattering is an integral part of the ontology 
of the world in its dynamic presencing. Not even a moment exists on its 
own. “This” and “that,” “here” and “now,” don’t pre-exist what happens 
but come alive with each meeting … Meeting each moment, being alive to 
the possibilities of becoming, is an ethical call, an invitation that is written 
into the very matter of all being and becoming.  
(Barad 2007: 396)  
 
 
Introduction 
Playworkers in the UK work with school-aged children to support their play. The practice is 
underpinned by a set of principles that establish playwork’s professional and ethical 
framework (PPSG 2005). These principles create a number of contradictions for practice that 
have an ethical dimension, and this chapter offers a modest exploration of this that seeks to 
reconfigure taken-for-granted assumptions that have become common sense truths. It is 
modest in the sense that it marks an experimental and initial playing with ideas that are 
different for the author: philosophy as an activity in the midst of it (Massumi 2011). It is 
offered as an ‘expression’: not a reproduction of an already existing state of affairs to be 
accurately communicated, more an immanent, mutual deterritorialisation of the gap between 
content and form of expression. This is itself an ethical act: 
 
There is indeed an ethics of expression ... It is a basically pragmatic 
question of how one performatively contributes to the stretch of expression 
in the world – or conversely prolongs its capture … Where expression 
stretches, potential determinately emerges into something new. 
Expression’s tensing is by nature creative …To tend the stretch of 
expression, to foster and inflect it rather than trying to own it, is to enter 
the stream, contributing to its probings: this is co-creative, an aesthetic 
endeavor. It is also an ethical endeavor, since it is to ally oneself with 
change: for an ethics of emergence.  
(Massumi 2002: xxii) 
 
In this spirit of modest and ethical expression, then, the chapter opens by placing the 
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Playwork Principles in the midst of their historical context, noting the shift towards 
prescription and technical standards for practice alongside an enduring sense of dissent and 
recalcitrance within playwork as a heterogeneous community of practice. Implicit in this 
‘minoritarian becoming-playworker’ (adapting Braidotti 2012) is an appreciation of the nature 
and value of children’s play that resists dominant, totalising, developmentalist and 
instrumental narratives (Lester and Russell 2013). Such an appreciation is evident in 
playwork practice (Lester et al., 2014; Russell 2013), but is articulated infrequently. A 
different ‘cut’ on childhood and play that decentres playwork’s focus on the psychological 
subject - and particularly on the material discursive practice of ‘intervention’ - is offered here 
as a contribution to the ‘stretch of expression’, given the mutual implication of epistemology, 
ontology and ethics (Barad 2007).  
 
Following this, the chapter critiques the notion of the autonomous rational agent implicit in 
the Playwork Principles’ understanding of both play and playwork to reconfigure playwork as 
relational, affective and affecting, embodied, situated and not reducible to representations in 
language. What is attempted here is a diffractive reading of texts through each other (a 
‘mash-up’ perhaps, or an ongoing game of Donna Haraway’s [1994] cat’s cradle) of the work 
of Karen Barad and Rosi Braidotti, with a sprinkling of Judith Butler, in order to offer an 
alternative posthuman, nomadic and relational ethics that acknowledges the complexities of 
the emergent, ongoing and intra-active co-production of play space in which playworkers are 
already directly implicated.  
 
   
Playwork as ‘becoming-minoritarian’ practice: the entanglement of knowledge, being 
and ethics 
Although playworkers in the UK work in a range of contexts, its best-known theorists hail 
mainly from the adventure playground movement (Brown 2003, 2008; Else 2014; Hughes 
2006, 2012; Sturrock and Else 2005). This has played its part in the development of an ethos 
that places high value on self-organised, outdoor play with easy access to a range of 
indeterminate materials, tools, and the elements (Russell 2013). Adventure playgrounds were 
introduced to the UK by Lady Allen of Hurtwood following her visit to the junk playground 
in Emdrup, Copenhagen in 1948 and were largely welcomed by the authorities as an effective 
response to a post-war rise in delinquency amongst working class boys (Cranwell 2007). 
Although permissiveness and democracy, even anarchy, were at the heart of the adventure 
playground endeavour, Kozlovsky (2008) suggests this was aimed ultimately at meeting 
policy’s instrumental goals. Out of anarchy and freedom would come an understanding of 
democracy and citizenship. In the 1960s and 1970s, the work attracted a significant number of 
people sympathetic to the civil liberties movements, and playwork was at that time often 
closely allied to radical community development, community arts and youth work (Cranwell 
2007), with many playworkers being ‘a mixture of hippy idealists, anarcho-punks and 
grass-roots community activists with strong libertarian and left-wing beliefs’ (Conway 2005: 
2). 
 
In the ensuing decades, shifts in the socio-political landscape raised a number of challenges to 
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the original permissive, adventurous and democratic ethos. In particular, the introduction of 
health and safety legislation, registration and inspection regimes and the marketization of 
public services contributed to the development of externally derived prescriptions and 
standards (Lester and Russell 2013; Shier 1984). Playwork’s institutions tried to tread the path 
between protecting this ethos and retaining some control over the development of such 
standards that have now become an accepted aspect of the work (Russell 2013). 
 
These technical standards (for example, National Occupational Standards, quality assurance 
schemes, risk assessment forms, registration guidelines) mark a significant shift away from 
the experimentation, unpredictability, anarchy and freedoms of early adventure playground 
pioneers (Allen 1968; Benjamin 1961, 1974; Hughes 1975), leading some to mourn the loss 
of a movement, although the idea of ‘play’ (as a synecdoche encompassing children’s play 
and adult support for it) as ‘a dissenting presence that had the capability to invalidate 
dominant norms, needs and values … remains strong’ (Cranwell 2007: 62). 
 
What can be seen here is a dialectic playing out between playwork as a social practice with 
shared internal goods (MacIntyre 2007) and an increasing focus on technical skills and 
instrumental outcomes led by playwork’s institutions in the name of recognition and status. 
Playwork’s ‘dissenting presence’, or its recalcitrance (Battram and Russell 2002), might be 
understood as an attempt by a social practice to curb the potential for institutions to corrupt its 
value base (MacIntyre 2007). The tension remains and is played out in the endless rounds of 
meetings where official articulations - playwork’s ‘professing’ - are revised, reworded and 
repackaged in attempts to resolve contradictions both within the practice and between the 
practice and its institutions. This exercise, however, is doomed to failure: the ineffable 
qualities of the playwork approach cannot be fixed in time or contained absolutely by 
representation in this technical manner, as there will always be something that exceeds it, that 
cannot be articulated in the limits of language. 
 
It perhaps needs to be stressed, however, that this dialectic is by no means a static binary or 
negative opposition. A Lefebvrian (2009) perspective sees dialectics as the basis for perpetual 
change, ceaseless becoming, through the entanglements of a triad of social practice (from 
Marx), language and thought (from Hegel) and a Dionysian playfulness/creativity (from 
Nietzsche) (Schmidt 2008). Rather than the binary negation of essentialist Hegelian dialectics 
critiqued by Deleuze (1968), such a position can connect with his affirmative 
‘difference-in-itself’. This requires a nomadic rather than a fixed codifying approach, open to 
difference, deterritorialising the measured, striated spaces of totalising certainties (Deuchars 
2011).  
 
This always-becoming dialectical triad is cut here with Barad’s (2007) entanglement of 
epistemology, ontology and ethics. Contrary to Levinas’ (1989) argument that ethics is first 
philosophy prior to epistemology and ontology, Barad (2007: 185) argues that none is prior:  
 
Practices of knowing and being are not isolable; they are mutually 
implicated. We don’t obtain knowledge by standing outside the world; we 
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know because we are of the world … The separation of epistemology from 
ontology is a reverberation of a metaphysics that assumes an inherent 
difference between human and nonhuman, subject and object, mind and 
body, matter and discourse … what we need is something like an 
ethico-onto-epistem-ology – an appreciation of the intertwining of ethics, 
knowing and being – since each intra-action matters. 
 
We have fallen into the common sense belief that there are fixed and pre-existing realities that 
can be first discovered and then mirrored faithfully in language. Both these assumptions have 
been challenged through Barad’s (2007) theory of agential realism, developed from the 
radical challenge to traditional epistemology brought by Niels Bohr’s work on quantum 
physics. These ideas are complex and profound and cannot be adequately summarised here 
without inevitable oversimplification if not misrepresentation. Nevertheless, key concepts can 
be used as tropes (as Baradian apparatuses perhaps) to offer up a different way of configuring 
what we know about children’s play and playwork, or rather, to offer up difference itself as a 
way of configuring them. In a shift of optical metaphor, rather than seeking to reflect 
accurately and objectively a pre-existing and concrete reality, ‘setting up worries about copy 
and original and the search for the authentic and the really real’ (Haraway 1997, cited in 
Barad 2007: 71), a diffractive analysis offers ‘a mapping of interference … A diffraction 
pattern does not map where differences appear, but rather maps where the effects of difference 
appear’ (Haraway 1992: 300). For Barad, the diffraction apparatuses in physics not only 
reveal the effect of changes that occur when a wave hits an obstacle or slit, they reveal the 
entangled structure of phenomena: 
 
“Things” don’t pre-exist … Matter is … not to be understood as a property 
of things but, like discursive practices, must be understood in more 
dynamic and productive terms – in terms of intra-activity. 
(Barad 2007: 150) 
 
Barad coins the term ‘intra-action’ to extend the notion of interaction (which assumes 
pre-existing agencies) in order to emphasise how agencies emerge through the process of 
intra-action. This concept is revisited later in the chapter. 
 
Representationalism assumes the knower to be apart from that which is known. The play 
scholar can define and categorise play as something that exists out there independently of 
their observation, and that can be accurately represented in language. Defining play requires 
that its boundaries are fixed and identifiable, that there is a clear separation between play and 
not-play. The generic concept can then be broken down into smaller bounded and identifiable 
categories (locomotor play, social play, rough and tumble, for example) with attendant 
benefits. A performative approach, however, sees ‘thinking, observing, and theorizing as 
practices of engagement with, and as part of, the world in which we have our being’ (Barad 
2007: 133). Defining and categorising are boundary-making practices that have material 
effects. Furthermore, a posthumanist performative approach not only challenges the ability of 
language to reflect a reality awaiting discovery, it also challenges the anthropocentric 
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arrogance that humans are somehow apart from nature, an assumption implicit in 
nature-culture and subject-object binaries; it also pays attention to material, nonhuman bodies, 
in the ongoing becoming of the world. Knowledge and meaning are enacted as material 
discursive practices that determine what can and cannot be said about play and about the 
relationship of playworkers to playing (or non-playing) children. Knowledge thereby becomes 
intimately entangled with practice; our current ways of thinking and speaking about play 
enact an agential cut that closes down other ways of thinking and therefore acting: ‘discursive 
practices are specific material (re)configurings of the world through which the determination 
of boundaries, properties, and meanings is differentially enacted’ (Barad 2007: 149). 
 
Given all of this, dissent and recalcitrance are important features of playwork ethics, together 
with an openness to difference (in terms of the otherness of other humans and non-humans, 
and also of a constant state of becoming). They represent a form of ‘becoming minoritarian’ 
practice that seeks to ‘escape from “majoritarian” norms, subject positions, and habits of mind 
and practice’ (Lenz-Taguchi 2012: 267), the agential cuts that produce habitual material 
discursive practice. This is ethical because it disturbs the hegemonic, common-sense, 
totalising material discursive practices that have emerged from the marketized, New Public 
Management (NPM) focus on performance indicators, outcomes and technical standards now 
the norm in public service (Banks 2004; Dahlberg and Moss 2008), together with the 
dominance of psychology in the twentieth century and the increasing reach of its gaze in the 
lives of children (Rose 1999a). A nomadic, relational ethics reconfigures the internalised, 
individuated, rational moral agent and pays attention to the forces, desires and entanglements 
of human, non-human and more-than-human becoming-players that affect and are affected by 
each other in ways that seek to bring about yet-to-be conditions (Braidotti 2012). The 
different diffractive cut on children’s play and playwork offered here opens up ethical 
possibilities for knowing and being, for a different ethics – or an ethics of difference – for 
playwork.   
 
Playwork’s recalcitrance is seen less in grand gestures of major politics and more in everyday 
‘minor’ acts that carry a hope for a better today rather than some final future utopian project 
(Horton and Kraftl 2009; Rose 1999b): moments of nonsense and playfulness that can emerge 
in spaces where conditions are supportive. These rarely find their way into ‘serious’ texts 
about playwork, but have begun to emerge in the virtual spaces of social media. Playwork 
practice based largely on tacit knowledge, intuitions, hunches and an ‘ineffable knack’ (Heron 
1996) intersects with external pressures to categorise and codify play into a thing to be 
provided for its assumed instrumental and future-focused benefits.  
 
Such an ethical stance can be argued for any work with people, but it is particularly salient for 
those who work with children at play, given both the otherness of children and the notion that 
play itself can be seen as a Deleuzian line of flight from the dominant adult orderings of time 
and space (Lester 2013), where such a line of flight ‘does not mean to flee but to re-create or 
act against dominant systems of thought and social conditions’ (Deuchars 2011: 5).  
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Apollo and Dionysus at play 
Most playworkers, particularly those in open access
i
 settings, are funded through the public 
purse and so need to justify their work in the language of whatever social problem concerns 
governments at that time. In this endeavour, Apollo rules in the playground. The majoritarian 
material discursive practice that sees play as a mechanism for learning skills needed later in 
adult life privileges a pre-existing, stable and separate Cartesian mind over a Dionysian body 
that requires disciplining. Particular forms of playing are valued over others for their 
perceived effectiveness in developing the desired skills and healthy bodies (Lester and Russell 
2013). Locomotor play becomes valuable in terms of preventing obesity (Alexander et al., 
2011). Pretend play is valued for its role in the development of social cognition and skills 
(Lillard et al., 2010). Even the category ‘risky play’ is psychologised so it is no longer 
irrational, unruly impulsivity in search of high excitement and arousal, rather it is a need that 
helps children develop risk assessment skills (Lester and Russell 2014).  
 
Nowhere is the Apollonian child more evident than in the ‘return-to-nature’ movement that is 
a current focus of play advocates and environmental organisations alike.
ii
 The research 
agenda, and subsequent benefit claims, focus again on the development of disembodied 
cognitive capacities, including pro-environmental attitudes, mental health and emotion 
regulation, scientific learning and environmental knowledge (Gill 2011). The author of the 
psychopathologising concept of ‘nature deficit disorder’ (Louv 2005) encapsulates this in his 
blog post entitled ‘Want your children to get into Harvard? Tell ’em to go outside!’ (Louv, 
2011).  
 
In all of this, play is seen unproblematically as a force for good, with singular causal links 
being made between particular forms of play and desired, predominantly cognitive, skills. 
Play becomes reified, even commodified, into something to be provided by (well-meaning) 
adults as a way of helping children to fulfil their potential (Lester and Russell 2013) and to 
ward off our own adult ontological and existential anxieties about the future (Katz 2008; 
Kraftl 2008). Inevitably, this leads to privileging some forms of play over others, particularly 
over the Dionysian forms of playing that may elicit adult anxiety or offence (Sutton-Smith 
1997) and that are not necessarily inherently ‘good’.  
 
What this illustrates is the entanglement of epistemology, ontology and ethics through 
majoritarian material discursive practices. They have become so pervasive that they are 
understood as common sense. It is argued here that ethical playwork has a responsibility to 
disturb these understandings in order to offer a minoritarian, diffractive cut (Lester et al., 
2014): not another fixed position in opposition, rather an openness to what might be different. 
 
These two forms of future-focused, utopian territorialisation of children’s play (Bauman 2003; 
Lester and Russell 2013) - that is, its instrumentalisation in social policy (and therefore public 
funding) and its rational, Apollonian bias - create ethical paradoxes for playworkers 
discernible in the assumptions underpinning the Playwork Principle as a code of ethics, and so 
it is to an examination of these that we now turn. 
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Decentring the human subject in the Playwork Principles as a code of ethics 
Codes of professional ethics are generally public statements that profess a service ideal. As 
such, their intention is to fulfil a number of functions including protecting service users, 
giving credence and professional status, giving guidance to practitioners, and helping to 
create and maintain professional identity (Banks, 2004). Such codes will always be 
problematic because of the tensions between prescription and professional judgement, and 
between universal principles and the particular in everyday situated practice.  
 
The service ideal articulated in the Playwork Principles asserts that the broader the range of 
opportunities available for children to play, the better for their development. However, the 
instrumentalisation and rationalisation of play that underpin the justification of public funding 
for playwork are directly countered by statements intended to minimise the ‘adulteration’ 
(Sturrock and Else 1998) of play, understood as the pollution of children’s ludic habitat with 
adult desires. This is particularly apparent in the definition of play as  
 
a process that is freely chosen, personally directed and intrinsically 
motivated. That is, children and young people determine and control the 
content and intent of their play, by following their own instincts, ideas and 
interests, in their own way for their own reasons. 
(PPSG 2005) 
 
Such characteristics, or equivalents, can be found in much of the literature on play, for 
example, Burghardt (2005), Caillois (1961), Garvey (1977), Huizinga (1955). They are 
problematic epistemologically, ontologically and ethically. Of particular relevance here is the 
assumption of an autonomous subject exercising rational agency over both human and 
nonhuman others from which they are ontologically discrete. Such an individualist conception 
of the subject can be challenged at a pragmatic level: everyday experience shows that 
compromise and negotiation are key features of playing with both human and non-human 
others, tempering absolute freedom of choice and direction. Barad’s (2007) work reveals the 
full extent of the entangled nature of matter (human and nonhuman bodies). Agency is not 
something that someone possesses, ‘agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their 
intra-action’ (Barad 2007: 33). She elaborates: 
 
Intra-actions are nonarbitrary, nondeterministic causal enactments through 
which matter-in-the-process-of-becoming is iteratively enfolded into its 
ongoing differential materialization. Such a dynamics is not marked by an 
exterior parameter called time, nor does it take place in a container called 
space. Rather, iterative intra-actions are the dynamics through which 
temporality and spatiality are produced and iteratively reconfigured. 
(Barad 2007: 179)  
 
At the risk of over-simplifying her work, what this does is radically reconfigure 
understandings of the ways in which space and time are produced. Human bodies are 
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entangled with other human and non-human bodies. A diffractive figuration of these 
entanglements (as meaning making and as material discursive practice) focuses less on fixed 
boundaries between play and not-play, this play and that play, good play and bad play, and 
more on the dynamic flows and forces of those entanglements and the possibility of 
becoming-different. As an affirmative figuration it focuses less on children’s needs to play in 
particular ways that are beneficial for their development – a positioning as lack – and more on 
the Deleuzian-Spinozan idea of conatus. This as ‘an affirmative, non-intentional intensity, 
producing connections … neither a “want” nor “lack” but the effort of an individual entity to 
persevere in its own existence … determined by its capacity to affect and be affected’ (Parr 
2005: 266), in terms of seeking to enhance capacities for joyful existence and avoiding 
connections that reduce that capacity. A state of playfulness may be seen as one of vitality; 
this is not merely ‘fun’ but a state of positive affect that enlivens things for the time of 
playing. As Lester (2013: 136-137) states: 
 
Deterritorialisation holds the most promise for self-ordering and ‘joy’; it is 
a desire to seek out leakages in the constraining molar system and establish 
molecular lines of flight away from the plane of organisation. The 
contention here is that playing may be seen as such a movement away from 
order, stability and predictability. It is the process of being a child 
becoming different and open to what it not yet is ... Playing may be seen as 
desiring to affect and be affected by creating uncertainty and disturbance, 
and to play with the relationship between disequilibrium and balance.  
 
‘Play spaces’ therefore do not pre-exist independently of their production, but emerge through 
the intra-actions of bodies, affects, histories, material and symbolic objects and so on. Space 
becomes relational, dynamic, and always in the making: ‘[e]vents and things do not occupy 
particular positions in space and time; rather, space, time and matter are iteratively produced 
and performed’ (Barad 2007: 393). Such a reconfiguration also requires a rethinking of 
intervention and adulteration, key apparatuses of playwork. The Playwork Principles state: 
 
Playworkers choose an intervention style that enables children and young 
people to extend their play. All playworker intervention must balance risk 
with the developmental benefit and wellbeing of children. 
 
Illustrative of the other statements that make up the Playwork Principles, this shows how they 
rest on assumptions that are deontological, utilitarian and teleological: universal assumptions 
of an autonomous rational agent and of the right actions to take, either according to 
professional duties or according to a form of felicific calculus that assumes particular 
outcomes from particular actions. Yet, as with the impossibility of the freely choosing child, 
playworkers are not apart from but a part of what happens, they are already in the midst of it, 
already implicated. If spaces are produced through entangled intra-actions, then there can be 
no single cause and effect of isolated actions that are currently described as interventions.  
 
This raises questions about the playworker as an ethical subject: if there are no singular 
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causes or no individual agents of change, where does responsibility lie? Barad suggests that if 
responsibility does not lie with individuals alone, this means that responsibility is even greater 
than if it did: ‘entanglements are … irreducible relations of responsibility'. She continues: 
 
Responsibility is not an obligation that the subject chooses … [it] is not a 
calculation to be performed. It is a relation always already integral to the 
world’s ongoing intra-active becoming and not-becoming. 
(Barad 2010: 265) 
 
 
Concluding thoughts: towards a playwork ethics of emergence 
The key point to be drawn from the discussion so far is that ethics, in this cut, is not about 
autonomous moral agents but first and foremost about relations. It is an ‘ethics of passion that 
aims at joy and not destruction’ (Braidotti 2012: 175) and at a collective well-being. In this 
sense it aligns with other poststructuralist philosophies that address politics and power. It is a 
nomadic ethics of emergence that requires continual questioning of majoritarian and habitual 
material discursive practices that can have the effect of overcoding and colonising children’s 
desires (Lester and Russell 2013). 
 
Embedded in such an ethics is the relation to the other. Responsibility to the other 
acknowledges an affirmative difference, appreciating children’s ‘otherness’ from adults and 
resisting the desire to ‘know’ them in terms of our own worldview, thereby turning them into 
versions of the same (Levinas 1969). As Braidotti (2012:172) argues: 
 
Otherness is approached as the expression of a productive limit, or 
generative threshold, which calls for an always already compromised set of 
negotiations. Nomadic theory prefers to look for the ways in which 
Otherness prompts, mobilizes, and allows for flows of affirmation of 
values and forces which are not yet sustained by the current conditions. 
 
The chapter closes with some tentative suggestions for what might be called dispositions for 
an ethics for playwork. These are adapted from Rushing’s (2010) analysis of Judith Butler’s 
ethics. They are not offered as essential characteristics of an ideal playworker, given what has 
been said here about moral agents. Butler makes the case for developing a subjectivity that is 
at ease with vulnerability, rather than the overriding thrust towards invincibility, mastery, 
supremacy. In applying Butler’s interpretation of Levinas to playwork, the relation with 
children precedes being a playworker; playworker subjectivities are produced through these 
relationships in an ongoing state of becoming. In this sense, they are performative.  
 
The dispositions proposed for an ethics of playwork are: openness, playfulness, humility, and 
patience/restraint as a disposition of not-doing that can guard against the totalising and 
essentialising that policy often assumes and requires.  
 
Openness is about being comfortable with not knowing, in terms of both children and 
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playwork colleagues as others and in terms of play’s unpredictability and spontaneity. 
‘Openness to others is an expression of the nomadic relational structure of the subject and a 
precondition for the creation of ethical bonds (Braidotti 2012: 174). 
 
Playfulness does not mean forever playing the clown. It does mean being open to turning 
situations on their head, accepting of moments of nonsense that arise, and bringing a playful 
disposition to situations that may be conflictual, if appropriate. It means not taking play too 
seriously, as it is far too important for that.  
 
Humility requires an uncertainty regarding our selves, given that categories (for example, 
woman, playworker) seek to essentialise and smooth away difference, a form of violence in 
the Levinasian sense. In the spirit of a nomadic ethics, this unsettles any core idea of identity, 
freeing us to be unknown to ourselves and to live at the edge of our own limits of knowledge. 
In terms of relationships with children, and especially children at play, ‘we work in a field of 
not knowing’ (Sturrock, Russell and Else, 2004: 33). 
 
Patience and restraint involves not demanding that the other explain or define themselves in a 
way we can understand. It is perhaps a disposition of not doing, of waiting and seeing. This is 
not to be confused with doing nothing, particularly in terms of discussions regarding 
intervention and adulteration in playwork. It requires a mindfulness and openness to the 
unknown and to uncertainty, perhaps even a sense of wonder at what may emerge rather than 
anxiety at what might happen. ‘The ethical subject is an embodied sensibility, which responds 
to its proximal relationship to the other through a mode of wonderment’ (Barad 2007: 391). 
Given all that has been said, it should go without saying that these are interdependent and 
interrelated, applying to relations both with the children and with other human and nonhuman 
bodies. Cultivating these dispositions may support the conditions for a radical ethics of 
transformation that pays attention to the forces and values of relations: the capacity to affect 
and be affected. 
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i
 The term ‘open access’ refers to play projects where the children are in principle free to come and go, 
in contrast to out of school settings where caregivers pay for childcare and the children stay until 
collected. In practice, the boundaries are not quite so clear cut, as some open access setting offer formal 
childcare or children are told by their caregivers to attend the setting until collected. 
ii
 For a detailed discussion of this, see Stuart Lester’s chapter in this book. 
